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The idea of nation in the 
19th century and Marxism
JOÃO ANTÔNIO DE PAULA
The idea of nation in the 19th century
BEGIN with Otto Vossler (1949, p.1): “Nationalism is the most characteristic political power of the 19th and the 20th Centuries. In the same way that the 16th and the 17th Centuries can be called the 
centuries of religious wars, the late 17th and the 18th Centuries can be called 
the centuries of Enlightenment, it can be said that the 19th and the 20th
Centuries are the centuries of nationalism. In fact, all the great political 
movements after the French Revolution are expressions and effects of the 
national desire.”
Vossler` s book mentioned above discusses both the concept of nation and 
some of its most signiﬁcant interpreters, from several political and ideological 
positions: Rousseau, Burke, Jefferson, Fichte, Wilhelm Humboldt, Mazzini, 
Hegel, Ranke.
That list, more than an arbitrary collection, synthesizes the wide range of 
perspectives that the topic “nation” brought about: the democratic romanticism 
of Rousseau and Jefferson; the fanatic conservatism of Burke; the idealism of 
Fichte and Hegel; the liberalism of Mazzini; the conservative historicism of 
Ranke. In fact, both the idea of nation and the concrete materialization of the 
nations and of the nationalisms from the French Revolution on are characterized 
by the disputes and the tensions, by the conﬂicts and the wars.
To state the central nature of the French Revolution as the initial mark 
of the expansion of the modern nations and nationalisms must not mean 
ignoring the existence of antecedents, of “protonationalisms” to use Hobsbawm’s 
expression, such as the case of the ideas by Lessing, Rousseau and Herder.
A decisive name of the German Enlightenment, Gotthold Theodor 
Lessing (1729-1781), is brought here to represent an attitude that inaugurates 
a strategy of national afﬁrmation based on the valuation of a cultural ethos,
of a moral appearance that structures a sense of “belonging”, which calls the 
nation. In the case of Germany in the ﬁrst half of the 18th Century, still perfectly 
fragmented and, for that reason, reduced in the face of already established 
National States, such as France and England, for example, the strategy to 
overcome the “backwardness”, to reach the European powers, mobilized, among 
other instruments, a questioning to the French cultural hegemony. Lessing 
presented that problem to himself based on the development of a speciﬁcally 
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German dramaturgy, which meant, promptly, a confrontation with the “theatrical 
Reform “ of Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766), a critic and professor 
greatly renowned at the time, who wanted to introduce in the German scene 
the rules of the French classical theater, of Pierre Corneille (1606-1684) and 
Jean Racine (1639-1699). Lessing fought Gottsched`s project opposing to the 
French classical tragedy the “genius” of Shakespeare, the excesses, the rage, the 
encyclopedia of the human feelings contained in his theater. But if Lessing is 
an extraordinary critic, both cultured and sensitive, perfectly in control of the 
aesthetic-literary issues, his basic motivation transcends the theatrical scope. His 
purpose, according to Anatol Rosenfeld (1964, p.17), is 
the struggle for a national and a bourgeois theater, for a theater that participated 
in the problems of the bourgeoisie to which it was tied, at the time, indissolubly, 
the progress of the nation: struggle for the emancipation which, in the concrete 
situation, necessarily had to move against the French Classicism (and against 
Gottsched, its German exponent), since it represented at the time a foreign 
theater, which hindered the emergence of the national potentialities, and it 
symbolized, above all, the spirit of absolutism.
Lessing, rhetor spirit of the German Enlightenment, fetched in the Baroque, 
in Shakespeare, the weapons against a Classicism which “supposedly universal” was, 
under those circumstances, the convalidation of the authority and of the orthodoxy, 
which obstructed the formation of the nation, of freedom and of tolerance.
To discuss Lessing’s attitude towards Classicism places a complex issue, with 
something paradoxical. It’s that there is, with reason, a strong afﬁnity between the 
Enlightenment and Classicism, and, nevertheless, Lessing’s Enlightenment must 
deny Classicism to afﬁrm the national, the political and cultural autonomy. That 
same standard can be seen in the case of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). 
Undeniably one of the great names of the French Enlightenment, the Geneva native 
was as more Enlightened as more he was recognized as the pioneer of the Romantic 
trend which, for all effects, was almost in a self-ascribed manner, a reaction to 
the Enlightenment, in several aspects. To the Enlightened Rousseau, direct and 
legitimate inspirer of the French Revolution, one should add the romantic and 
inspirer Rousseau of the national feeling.
According to Otto Vossler (1949, p.13): “Rousseau was the ﬁrst and, it 
can be said, the most important propeller of the desire and of the idea of nation”. 
A strong advocate of Geneva’s autonomy, the author of a Constitution project 
for Corsica, of a proposal of reform of the Polish Constitution, Rousseau also 
inspired the project of North American nation, which is associated to Thomas 
Jefferson (1743-1826). Rousseau was the author of the ideas of a social republic 
based on the small agricultural estate, protected from corruption, which wouldn’t 
be separated from the great city.
More than once, Rousseau registered the importance of John Locke 
(1632-1704) as a reference for the elaboration of his own political thought. 
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A reader and enthusiast of the great political thinkers of the classic Antiquity 
and of the civic virtues of the ancient people and of the civic humanism of the 
Renaissance, Rousseau took Locke as an interlocutor whom he respected, but 
whom he can’t follow completely. In the center of Rousseau’s criticism is the 
invocation of the “general desire” against the dictation of Locke’s privatist 
individualism. The synthesis of that opposition was placed, in an exemplary 
manner, in the differences between the triads of Locke and those of Jefferson, 
who was a disciple of Rousseau. According to Locke, on the Second Treaty on the 
Civil Government, written in 1690, the three inalienable rights of men are: the 
right of life, the right of liberty and the right of property. Jefferson, who wrote 
the Declaration of the Independence of the United States, in 1776, comes back to 
Locke’s triad changing it, as follows: the three inalienable rights of men are: the 
right of life, the right of liberty and the right of the pursuit of happiness. Those 
triads summarize both basic matrices of the bourgeois State: the liberal one, 
inspired by Locke and the democratic one, tributary of Rousseau’s lesson. In 
fact, with Rousseau there was the constitution not only of an idea of democratic 
republic, but there was also the outline of a nation.
Several authors pointed to the many and sometimes lacerating ambiguities of 
Rousseau’s thought, and they were right. As far as his conceptions of democracy and 
nation were concerned, there was also a strong ambiguity that had to be seen as 
transcending his biography. It has to do with a dilemma, which has presented itself 
many times, with serious political and social consequences, and that has to do with 
the indissociability of the democratic imperative for the legitimacy of the nation. 
In fact, the history of the capitalist States is marked by the recurrent mobilization 
of anti-democratic and discretionary political instruments, presented as essential 
measures either to build the nation or to guarantee its preservation against their 
internal and external enemies. The core of that issue can be seen in Rousseau, and 
Luis Roberto Salinas Fortes (1976, p.25-6) surprised him as follows: 
A great political distance seems, for example, to be in force between the Contract
and the Considerations on the Government of Poland, a text in which, asked to 
guide the Polish nobility that was facing the problem of the nation, in view of 
the foreign threats, Rousseau sponsored the cause of an aristocratic conservatism
which is not very compatible with the republican egalitarianism which he 
advocated in the realm of theory.
That issue was raised here to indicate a decisive contradiction, which moves 
alongside the relations between democracy and nation, which is the systematic 
belittling of the democracy on behalf of the interests of the nation turned into 
absolute and scared reality. And that issue was also raised to register that it is 
present among the most expressive and unsuspected names.
The second name among the proto-nationalists considered here is that of 
Herder. Also identiﬁed as one of the inaugurators of the Romantic movement, 
Herder will be acknowledged in the history of thought as one of the pioneers 
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both of nationalism and of historicism. Before Herder, Giambattista Vico (1668-
1744) had already dealt with those themes with an originality that wasn’t noticed 
in his time.
Both Vico and Herder were authors from the periphery. Isaíah Berlin 
(1982, p.6) called the attention to that, to the fact that Vico and Herder were able 
to formulate ideas displeasingly innovative starting from the European periphery. 
That’s where: “more relevant original ideas [were] generated in the Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies and, even more, in Western Prussia, often described as culturally 
backward places, in a time of intensive scientiﬁc and cultural activity”. 
It’s sustained here that that “originality”, that the capacity of certain 
authors from peripheral regions, in some moments, to innovate, to revolutionize the 
thought and the world, are manifestations of a desire for afﬁrmation and autonomy 
present in the processes of national building. Both Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-
1803) and, after him, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), from that point of view, 
are expressions of the long and winding path of the building of the German nation. 
Both the book Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, by Herder, of 1784, 
and the Speeches to the German Nation, by Fichte, made on December 13th, 1807 
and March 20th, 1808, belong to the same process which, very late, will result, in 
1871, in the uniﬁcation of the German National State.
Herder brought to the idea of nation the romantic accent, the valuation of 
the national spirit identiﬁed with the popular spirit: “Herder’s fame is due to the 
fact that he was the father of the nations related with nationalism, historicism and 
volksgeist, as well the leader of the romantic revolt against Classicism, rationalism 
and the faith in the omnipotence of the scientiﬁc method...” (Berlin, 1982, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau.
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p.133). Or still, according to Otto Maria Carpeaux (1961, p.1552): “Herder was 
the ﬁrst European who, remaining a cosmopolitan, in the Enlightenment sense, 
interpreted Europe as a symphony of several different voices, of the national 
voices, knowing how to distinguish them and characterize them...”.
The third name of the proto-nationalist ideas, which will be presented 
here, is that of Fichte. The circumstances that surrounded his “speeches” tell as 
much about his purposes as the own content of his preaching. Fichte made his 
speeches at the moment when Germany was occupied by the Napoleonic armies, 
and his message is, at the same time, the calling together to the building of the 
nation, that is, to the overcoming either of the age-old feudal structures, which 
still prevailed in Germany and that hindered its uniﬁcation, or of the immediate 
foreign domination under Napoleon, without that meaning a denial of the 
political and cultural advances that resulted from the French Revolution.
Fichte (1943, p.309 and 315), in a country militarily occupied, in a 
country both materially and institutionally backward, dared to complain to 
Germany: “to shelter the people, who among all the modern people, was the 
one who conserved the best the germ of human perfectness”, “the only (nation) 
among the neo-European people which demonstrated, centuries ago, through its 
bourgeois cities, that is liable to cope with a republican Constitution”.
About that, Francisco Ayala (1943, p.15) said: “The Speeches by Fichte 
have a general reach theoretical character when it builds, in a deﬁnite manner for 
Political Science, the concept of Nation as a valuable being, endowed with the 
living historical reality and with an inherent right “.
The argument can be summarized by saying that by the end of the 18th 
and the beginning of the 19th Centuries, there was the emergence of authors 
and ideas which, though heterogeneous in their philosophical ties, originated 
a political and cultural complex which, called proto-nationalism here, nurtured 
concrete projects of national building in the 19th Century in four great 
segments: 1. the liberal-bourgeois; 2. the democratic-bourgeois; 3. the counter-
revolutionary; 4. the socialist. The ﬁrst one of those segments was emblematically 
represented by the North American case; the second segment materialized itself 
in the French experience, during the period of the Jacobine Convention and in 
the ﬁrst stage of the Revolution of 1848; the third segment encompassed the 
experience of the Bourbon Restoration of 1815 and the German uniﬁcation 
under Prussian trusteeship; the fourth segment was represented by the experience 
of the Paris Commune, of 1871.
The cases mentioned here don’t exhaust the universe of the concrete 
national building process in the 19th Century, which admitted hybrid forms and 
inconclusive experiences, such as the case of Italy, which deserves to be highlighted.
The Italian uniﬁcation process took place between 1861 and 1870, and was 
particularly complex due to the variety and the discrepancy of the forces, interests 
and intervening ideas. In a situation similar to that of Germany, Italy was also 
marked by the lasting permanence of institutions that were typical of feudalism. If 
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in Germany the chimera of the restoration of the Sacred Roman-German Empire 
harassed and condemned the country to a long and dramatic bet on the past, in 
Italy that role of linking to the archaic was exercised by the equally long papal 
domination, which in a somewhat delirious sign, by the end of its power, challenged 
modernity with the encyclicals Quanta cura, of 1864, and Syllabus, of 1870, which 
were agonizing reactions by Pope Pius IX to the growing secularization.
From 1830 on, Italy witnessed the increase of the movement in favor 
of its national uniﬁcation, in a process that confronted both the power of the 
Habsburgs and their Italian domains, the old German dynasty, which dominated 
Sicily, and the Pope and his territories and his protector, France. The Italian 
uniﬁcation was characterized by the dispute between two perspectives: the liberal 
conservative perspective represented by Camillo B. Cavour (1810-1861) and the 
liberal-democratic one, synthesized in the ﬁgures of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-
1872) and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882).
Analyzing the process of the Risorgimento italiano, Antonio Gramsci 
(1978, p.275-6) said that, during all the time, the Action Party, of Mazzini and 
Garibaldi, was guided by the moderate, from which resulted that, in the end, the 
uniﬁcation met, above all, the interests of the great capital, of the large landed 
estate owners, of the bourgeois nobility to the detriment of the rural and the 
urban workers, in a process of income, wealth and capital concentration with a 
strong regional discount, meaning the extension of the inequalities between the 
North and the South of the country.
The four segments of the national building considered here have a 
theoretical and philosophical base which is equally complex. If the bourgeois 
liberalism adapted itself in the United States as its privileged territory, the victory 
of the perspective based in Locke, represented by the decisive action of Alexander 
Hamilton, who ran the North American economic policy, in its ﬁrst few years, 
was not immediate. In fact, between 1776 and 1787, between the Independence 
and the Constitution, the North American republic underwent a dispute between 
the trend led by Jefferson and his idea of democracy, inspired in Rousseau, and 
the liberal republic, in Hobbes’s and Locke’s fashion, spread in the United States 
by the “federalists”: A. Hamilton (1757-1804), James Madison (1751-1836) and 
John Jay (1745-1829).
Indeed, despite the actual victory of the federalists from the point of view 
of the formatting of the North American State, the liberal-democratic perspective 
remained an important political reference between 1820 and 1840, having 
inﬂuenced in a decisive manner the vision that Alexis Tocqueville (1805-1859) 
established of the United States. Besides, for such men as Henri David Thoreau 
(1817-1862), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Walt Whitman (1819-
1892), the United States of halfway through the 19th Century could still appear 
as a social, open and pluralist democracy.
In his book Democracy in America, Tocqueville (1962) said that the power 
and the establishment of the democracy in that country, which he got to know 
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in the 1830’s, resulted from three factors  which characterized its political and 
social institutions: its localism, its individualism and its privatism. Tocqueville’s 
argument was that the power of the North American democracy in the 19th 
Century rested on the fact that the State had to be able to acknowledge its 
citizens as holders of rights, which it had to provide. The denial of that image 
of integration, due to the presence of slavery in the South of the country, was 
overcome by the Civil War (1861-1865), which also resulted in the extension of 
the access to land for a huge ﬂow of migrants which went to the United States 
from 1880 on.
The fact that that image of the United States as being a social, open and 
pluralist democracy, has been, since the 19th Century, a myth with clear political 
and ideological purposes, didn’t reduce its effectiveness, above all when it was 
confronted with other segments of the national building, such as the democratic-
bourgeois and the counter-revolutionary ones. 
The democratic-popular nation, the nation that resulted from the broad 
social mobilization, inspired fear and panic either in its Jacobine version or in its 
events of 1848.
The reactionary thought believed that the French Revolution was the evil 
to be fought since it was the matrix of all others. According to the Frenchmen  
L. G. de Bonald (1754-1840) and Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), as well as 
to the Irish Edmund Burke (1729-1797), it was necessary to attack the French 
Revolution either because of its political implications – the calling of the popular 
participation, the end of the privilege etc. – or because of its philosophical 
implications. According to Touchard (1972, p.374): “The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen roused in a special manner Burke’s vehement 
sarcasms. Before it, he invoked the particular, the single, what was wonderful 
about the natural differences of the place, of time, of the habits, of the 
experiences and of people”.
As a reaction to what in the French Revolution called upon the “universal 
fraternity”, the counter-revolutionary thought was a signiﬁcant support of the 
conservative nationalism either of the French trends of the 19th Century or of the 
conservative German trends which, inspired by the historicist thought, eventually 
established the political and cultural principles of the German uniﬁcation.
It’s certain that the French nationalism of the 19th Century wasn’t only 
reaction and conservatism, that Michelet (1798-1874) can’t be forgotten and that 
he’s the best representative of the democratic and popular national perspective. 
But it’s within the scope of the message that goes from conservatism, from 
traditionalism to the anti-democratic, racist and xenophobic reaction that the 
ideas of nation and the French nationalism move more strongly, either in the 
context of the Revolution of 1848 or as a reaction to the defeat in the war against 
Prussia in 1870, or as a reaction to the Paris Commune, in 1871, or as a reaction 
to the crisis of the Third Republic, in the end of the 19th Century, of which the 
Dreyfus case was emblematic.
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It’s about the reiteration of a conservative tradition that began with 
François-René Chateaubriand (1768-1848) and Felicité Robert de Lamennais 
(1782-1854), had its intermediate period with François P. G. Guizot (1787-1874), 
Pierre G. F. Le Play (1806-1882), Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Hippolyte 
Taine (1828-1893), and ended with the authors who were born in the second half 
of the 19th Century: Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) and Charles Maurras (1868-
1952). From the catholic and aristocraticizing traditionalism of Chateaubriand and 
Lamennais, to the scientiﬁcist and patriotic conservatism of Renan-Taine-Le Play, 
to the monarchist, militarist and anti-semitic nationalism of Barrès-Maurras-Péguy. 
In all those versions, the basic unit of thought was the use of the idea of nation as 
an instrument to ﬁght against democracy, the popular movement and socialism.
It’s also under the sign of the counter-revolution that one must include the 
movement that resulted in the uniﬁcation of Germany, in 1871.
It must be warned once again that, when the conservative centrality of the 
political and ideological movement which led to the uniﬁcation of Germany is 
mentioned, we are not ignoring the existence of theoretical trends and concrete 
political movements, such as the ones expressed in the Revolution of 1848-1849, 
which demanded the development of a democratic Germany. The great romantic 
poet Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) and the group called “leftist Hegelians “, 
of which both Marx (1818-1883) and Engels (1820-1895) participated were 
emblematic of that trend.
Authors and theoretical trends have already been mentioned here, such as 
the romanticism of Herder, the idealism of Fichte, which provided elements for 
the building of the idea of nation in Germany. Now let’s talk about historicism. 
The so-called German Historic School, either in the ﬁeld of Law with Friedrich 
Savigny (1779-1861), Gustav Hugo (1764-1844) and Karl F. Eichhorn (1781-
1854); or in the ﬁeld of History, with Barthold Niehbuhr (1776-1831), Leopold 
Ranke (1795-1886), Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), Heinrich Sybel (1817-1895), 
Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) and Heinrich Treitschke (1834-1896); or in 
the ﬁeld of Economy, com Hugo Hildebrand (1812-1878), Karl Roscher (1817-
1894), Karl Knies (1821-1898), Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), Werner Sombart 
(1863-1941) and Max Weber (1864-1920), was the ideological support of the 
building of Germany, either in its pioneer Prussian matrix or in its consequences.
Mainly the historians were followers of the “small Germany”, of the 
Germany under Prussian domination and which excluded Austria from the 
German uniﬁcation. Advocates of the Prussian tradition and future supporters of 
the Bismarckian policy, those historians who emerged between 1840 and 1848 
were, in fact, “historians of the new German Empire, even though their works, 
except for Treitschke, were prior to the formation of this Empire” (Guilland, 
1899, p.2-3).
Also adversaries of the Enlightenment` s universalizing rationalism, 
the German historians appealed to a conception of history which, refusing 
the abstractions, the generalizations, emphasized and valuated the irreducible 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 22 (62), 2008 227
character of the regional conﬁgurations, which were unique in every aspect. That 
theoretical and methodological stance, characteristic of the German Historic 
School, in fact, constituted the modern historiography, the so-called scientiﬁc 
historiography, either because of the great development it brought to the 
methodology of the historical research or because of the actual extension of the 
historiographical ﬁeld, which became global since then.
Alongside history, geography also played an important role in the building 
of the German nation, with the creation of geopolitics, from the work of 
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) on.
Having occurred simultaneously, the Italian and the German uniﬁcation 
processes were signiﬁcantly different from one another. In the Germany case it 
wasn’t a movement that sought liberty from the foreign domination, but one that 
built a political power, according to Benedetto Croce (1950, p.262). The formation 
of the National State based on a militarist strategy led by Prussia and the wars of 
1862, against Denmark, of 1866, against Austria, and 1870, against France. 
The German historicists made politics: 
While Droysen, Heinrich von Sybel or Mommsen were on the side of liberalism, 
even after the bitter disappointment for the failure in 1848, others such as 
Treitschke, did nothing more than continue the work of turning the state sacred, 
identiﬁed as the “the people united by law and considered as a great independent 
power” which has the right to “make its will prevail by means of the arms against 
the foreign will”. The purpose of the nation-states was war: “War is not only a 
practical need: it’s also a theoretical need, a requirement of logic. The concept of 
state implies that of war, since the essence of the state is the power. The state is the 
people organized in sovereign power”. (Treitschke apud Fontana, 2004, p.229)
Among the German historicists in the ﬁeld of economy, let’s still recall 
Adam Müller (1779-1829) and Friedrich List (1789-1846) who, specially the 
latter, brought to the economic thought the speciﬁcally national datum in direct 
opposition to what was practiced by the classical economic thought, which 
abstracted the national singularities of the economic processes centering itself 
in the building of the abstract general laws that were believed to be able to 
reproduce the economic reality in a conceptual manner.
The book by List, National System of the Political Economy, of 1841, 
more than outlining the generic working of the economy, was a political 
undertaking with direct incidence in the process both of the German 
uniﬁcation and of its industrial development through advocating the thesis of 
the “protection of the emerging industry”. The irony of that situation is that 
List learned the protectionist principles that he advocated for the German 
industrial development in the United States, based on the success of the policies 
developed by Alexander Hamilton.
Not all the German historicists must be considered Bismarckists. Some 
historicists criticized him and didn’t support certain aspects of his politics, such 
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as Mommsen and Max Weber. But it’s undeniable that historicism, as a trend, 
provided an important contribution for the building of the theoretical and 
ideological substrate of the Wilhelmine empire and his militarist expansionism, 
stating an identity, tragic in its consequences, between the Hohenzollern 
empire and the nation, which was swallowed by a whirlpool of xenophobia and 
aggressiveness from which not even most of the German left escaped. It’s as a 
requiem to those tragic illusions that The Decline of the West, by Oswald Spengler 
(1880-1936), published in 1918, must be read.
The Spanish intellectuals subject to the traumatic experience of the defeat 
of Spain, in 1898, in the war against the United States, also placed themselves 
under the sign of disenchantment and tragedy. That generation that took on the 
name of the unlucky year of the Spanish defeat, “1898”, also made an original 
voice echo in the debate about the nation and nationalism. In fact, the Spanish 
intellectuals of the “generation of 1898” extended and updated the already 
very old bewilderment which abased itself on the Spanish awareness, stunned 
and bitter since an exuberant and stubborn crisis installed itself in the powerful 
empire at the time, already by the end of the 16th Century.
The topic of the decadence and the search for the Spanish “regeneration” 
occupied many generations of Spanish thinkers, from Cervantes (1547-1616) 
to Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955). The answer by Cervantes was extraordinarily 
lucid. According to Cervantes, the Spanish decadence, expressed in the mistaken 
ambiguous peregrination of the Mancha nobleman, results from his attachment to 
a past which was dead and irrecoverable for good. According to Ortega y Gasset 
(1948), Spain would suffer a constitutive “invertebration”, a fragmentation which 
would hinder the consequent and orderly action. According to Ortega y Gasset 
(1948), Spain` s situation was tragic, since it was a country which would only have 
as single institution... the Inquisition.
By the end of the 19th Century, the idea of nation in Europe was to a 
great extent shut away by the conservative thought: both in Spain and in France 
and Germany. The nation as the weapon par excellence, which the right handled 
to hit either the democratic claims or socialism.
It’s within that framework that the stance by Marx and Engels about the 
national issue must be discussed.
The idea of nation and Marxism
The idea that Marx and Engels were internationalists, who advocated the 
world revolution, who ascribed to socialism a global character is widespread and 
correct. People often add to that idea another one, according to which Marx and 
Engels, being internationalists, were contrary to the national struggles, to the 
national issue, considered as bourgeois issues which, apart from that, in many 
cases, delayed the struggle of the proletariat for its full emancipation, which 
would also be the one that would mean the emancipation of humanity as a whole 
from its actual “minority”.
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If the ﬁrst term of that issue is indisputable, Marx and Engels were, indeed 
internationalists, the second part of the statement, the one that establishes an 
opposition that can’t be cancelled between the internationalist struggle and the 
national one, from the strictly socialist point of view, deserves some repairs, as 
well as the assumption, which seems implicit, about the monolithic nature of the 
position of Marx and Engels, which didn’t change throughout time, without 
nuances or re-qualiﬁcations. 
In that speciﬁc case, as far as the consideration of the national issues 
were concerned, Marx’s position wasn’t always the same. Many authors, such 
as José Aricó, Teodor Shanin, and René Galissot, among others, identify 
the existence of phases in Marx’s thought about the national issue. Roughly 
speaking, it could be said that Marx’s position about the national issue had 
two great stages: the ﬁrst one was marked by the internationalist perspective, 
which totally supported the national issue, and which ended in the beginning 
of the 1870’s, and a second stage, from the beginning of the 1870’s on, 
which extended until the end of Marx’s life, in 1883, in which the national 
issue took on importance. There Marx’s growing interest for the Russian 
reality and, by extension, for the reality of other countries of the periphery 
of capitalism stood out, without that meaning an abandonment of the 
internationalist perspective.
Until 1869, the German social-democrats and with Marx’s guarantee, 
refused to include the national issue in the program of the party, “stating that it 
was a merely bourgeois issue”, reiterating the thesis expressed in the Communist
Manifesto that “the workers have no homeland” (Galissot, 1984, p.173).
Anyway, even that workers’ internationalism, from which Marx and 
Engels never moved away, was never so strict as to ignore the singularities 
and the importance of national struggles such as in the cases of Ireland and 
Poland. About that, it should be recalled that the International Association of 
the Workers, the so-called I International, founded in 1864, had among the 
immediate motivating elements of its creation the consequences of the repression 
to the independence movement of Poland, of 1863.
Engels highlighted the uniqueness of the Irish and Polish cases within 
the scope of the workers’ internationalism on a letter to Kautsky, dated February 
7th, 1882. According to Engels (apud Haupt & Weill, 1980, p.50): “Two nations 
in Europe have not only the right but the obligation to be national before they 
become international: the Irish and the Polish. Once they manage to become 
national, they will also be better international”.
The change of Marx and Engels concerning the Irish issue had an 
enormous theoretical and political importance, marking, indeed, a new stage in 
the thought of both authors. According to José Aricó (1982, p.54-5): 
in the same way that in a ﬁrst stage of their reﬂections Marx and Engels thought 
that the independence of Ireland should be a result of the revolution in England, 
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from 1867 on they started to extract important political conclusions from the fact 
that they acknowledged that the British workers’ movement resulted from the 
colonial plundering of the Irish people established by Great Britain. Since then, 
according to Marx and Engels, the national emancipation of Ireland would be 
the ﬁrst condition for the social emancipation of the British proletariat. 
The issue of the place of the national issue in the work of Marx and Engels 
has fostered many qualiﬁed interventions, such as that by Roman Rosdolsky. 
Writing about the subject, Rosdolsky raised the hypothesis that, mainly Engels, 
in that case, has paid an excessive price to Hegel’s ideas about the “people with no 
history” (Haupt & Weill, 1980, p.17).
It’s impossible to follow Rosdolsky in that case. In fact, both Marx and 
Engels shared, at least for some time, a vision of the global historical development 
that resulted to a great extent from Hegel’s theses about the universalization 
process of history, which implied establishing binding laws of development, 
in which the most advanced country foreshadows the path of the backward 
countries. It was based on that vision that Marx wrote, in the foreword of the ﬁrst 
German edition of The Capital, in 1867, “De te fabula Narratur”, to characterize 
his certainty that England was only the ﬁrst to make a path that all capitalist 
countries would make from then on.
The precise understanding of that issue implies acknowledging important 
differences in the levels of conceptual abstraction of Marx’s work, which is at the 
same time a criticism of the political economy, a philosophy and an invitation to 
action, that is, a practical and political proposal.
In that sense, for the just classiﬁcation of the national issue in the set 
of Marx’s work, one should try to establish initially the broader conceptual 
framework, resultant from the criticism of the political economy in which the 
national issue must be included.
It is advocated here that Marx’s position on the issue must be considered 
according to the theoretical classiﬁcation in which Book I of The Capital is 
included. That book deals with the capital in general, that is, with the capital 
taken as an ideal average, as a fully established reality. Under those conditions, 
the necessary way to expose the capitalist dynamics would have to take as a matter 
liable of exempliﬁcation the most developed form, which the capital had reached 
until then: the British capitalism.
Books II and III of The Capital would mean, from the point of view of 
the material that they would contain and of the level of complexity with which 
the problems would be approached, proximities with the concrete world of the 
capital; in Book II by the consideration of the interference of space and time in 
the reproduction processes of the capital, and in Book III by the actual admission 
of the interaction among different capitals, structured in a different manner and 
in permanent competition with one another. (Rosdolsky, 1972).
If that’s the case, including in the possible exhibition in Book I of The 
Capital, the scope of capital in general, the debate on the national issue, on the 
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concrete interactions among the nations, on the political and cultural singularities 
of the nations would be perfectly inadequate and improper.
If England was the platform from where Marx elaborated the empirical 
material of Book I of The Capital, Teodor Shanin says that, for Book III, he 
wanted to use Russia as the empirical universe of the exhibition of the capital 
taken in its full complexity. One must see a strong intentionality in that choice. 
To choose Russia as the empirical matter of the exhibition of the capital taken in 
its complex entirety is to explicit the several dimensions and interactions, be them 
of a political, economic, social and cultural nature that conﬁgurate it.
Taken as complex of complexes, as set of sets, as complex entirety, The 
Capital, in what was designed to be Book III, would be fully prepared to receive 
and to consider, in an adequate manner, the national issue.
Another issue, not least important, has to do with the particular way that 
Marx and Engels considered, in their activities as journalists and politicians, the 
issues that concerned the nations, the national struggles. In that case, it must 
be said that here we must also distinguish two phases in the treatment of the 
national issue by Marx and Engels: a ﬁrst phase until 1872, and a second one 
after that date. 
In the ﬁrst phase, the general tone of the debates on the national issues is 
that of the expectation of an acceleration of the crises and of the urgency of the 
revolution which, starting from the central countries, would spread to the whole 
world. In that ﬁrst phase, the perspective of the two friends was one of conﬁdence 
in the immediate role that the workers of the central countries, understood as 
England, would play in the path towards the global socialist revolution.
As the years went by, with the defeats and the crises of the workers’ 
movement, with the settling and the co-optation of sectors of the working 
class, of many central countries, Marx and Engels acknowledged and valued the 
revolutionary potential of peripheral countries, overcoming what for some time 
was a limitation that resulted from excessive attachment to a still incomplete 
theoretical scheme.
That inﬂexion in the thought of Marx and Engels concerning the national 
issue resulted, in a decisive manner, from the growth of the I International and of 
the Paris Commune. The analysis of the virtues and the limits of the Commune 
forced a re-evaluation of set of the strategies and of the tactics, of the forces 
and of the instruments, of the ideas of the socialist movement. The Commune 
showed both the present character of the revolution and that the revolution didn’t 
need to be born in the center of capitalism. According to Marx (1975, p.210): 
“The struggle of the working class against the capitalist class entered a new phase 
with the combat that took place in Paris. Regardless of the immediate path that 
the things take, a new starting point of a universal historical importance was 
conquered”.
I see no purpose in distinguishing the positions of Marx and Engels 
concerning the national issue, and even less do I consider legitimate to ascribe 
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only to Engels the blemish of being Eurocentrist. In fact, that classiﬁcation, 
Eurocentrism, is inaccurate since it emphasizes what the position of Marx and 
Engels, at least for some time, wanted, explicitly, to deny. Both for the theoretical 
work and for the political action of the two friends, what mattered, initially, 
was to deny the national singularities of capitalism by means of showing and 
denouncing the hypertrophy of their generic determinations, the capital as value 
that valuates itself, everywhere and at all times, as a blind and impersonal force, 
based on the exploitation of the work force, in the private appropriation of social 
labor in the form of surplus value; the capital as expansive and destructive force, 
which produces unemployment, misery, and environmental destruction.
Before being “Eurocentrists”, Marx and Engels, perhaps, could be 
accused of “logocentrists”, because, in fact, it was the apprehension of the logic of 
functioning of the capital that enabled them to undertake both the criticism of 
the political economy and to claim the socialist revolution.
From 1872 on, Marx devoted himself to Russia, studied its language, 
followed its political life, contacted its leftist intellectuals and politicians. 
According to him, it’s from there, from Russia, that would come the decisive 
elements of a new revolutionary wave. The ﬁrst translation of The Capital was 
made into Russian.
Marx said that the Paris Commune opened a new revolutionary period, 
and that really happened. A revolutionary period which, placing the working class 
as subject, overﬂew the European borders as much as the capital had done. Marx 
and Engels had foreseen the internationalization of the capital in the Communist
Karl Marx.
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Manifesto, of 1848, and, in fact, that was taking place. Launched in the world, 
the capital modernized and submitted whatever it touched. Once the capital was 
internationalized, the class struggle, the contradictions, the conﬂicts, the political 
and cultural sharing were also internationalized. 
There are many signs of that modern internationalization of symbols and 
practices, of programs and aspirations and they have speciﬁc incidence in the 
periphery of capitalism: the invention of the word modernism was the work of a 
Nicaraguan writer, Rubén Dario (1876-1916), in 1890; the most actually innovative 
and disruptive forms of the artistic forefront of the beginning of the 20th Century 
came from the periphery, from Russia, Spain, Italy, with Picasso (1881-1973), Miró
(1893-1983), Chagall (1887-1985), Kandinsky (1866-1944), Malevitch (1878-1935), 
with the Constructivists, with the Futurists, with the Dadaists; the great social 
revolutions of the beginning of the 20th Century took place in the periphery: the 
Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Revolutions 
in the symbolic realm, promises of happiness and of emancipation which, starting in 
the periphery of capitalism, also claimed the nation.
It was Hegel (apud Febvre, 1998, p.167) who said: “You, the French, 
are lucky. You are a nation”. That sentence, within the context of the Hegelian 
philosophy, has two aspects that must be emphasized: it’s that the existence of the 
nation is an assumption for the building of the State, of the State that, according 
to Hegel, is the fulﬁllment of freedom. And in what sense, still within the scope 
of the Hegelian philosophy, would the nation enter in the concept of building 
of freedom? According to Hegel, the nation, the set of the singularities who 
deﬁne a people, that identify and organize it, had to ﬁnd out-build, beyond those 
singularities, what not only it but all the other nations have in common, and 
which qualify them to live as equals in their singularities, as human communities 
founded in an ethical manner, that is, founded in the idea that the freedom of 
someone presupposes the freedom of all others, in all levels and dimensions.
In an accurate formula, Professor Leyla Perrone-Moisés (2007, p.36) 
praised the goal of the nation, which is stating its universal value. The analysis 
made by Professor Perrone-Moisés also detected a paradox in the afﬁrmation 
of the nation. It’s that the nation, by developing in opposition to “another” 
oppressive one, eventually “reinforces localism and provincialism, even though 
the greatest goal is to prove the universal value of that singularity”.
In that case, demanding the nation would be at the same time confronting 
with another, adverse and oppressive. The acknowledgement of that oppressive 
other has legitimated the national cohesion and the nationalist struggle. However, 
even that nationalism would have problematic elements and backward contents. 
Let’s see what Isaac Deutscher (1997, p.62-3) says: 
Even the nationalism of the exploited and oppressed must be seen with critical 
eyes, since its development includes different phases. In a phase the progressive 
aspirations prevail; in another, reactionary trends emerge. When independence is 
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obtained, nationalism tends to completely abandon its revolutionary aspect and 
to transform itself in a backward ideology [...] Even in its revolutionary phase, all 
nationalism tend towards the irrationality, a tendency towards the exclusivism, 
the presence and racism.
It were considerations even more cutting than that one that led great 
names of Marxism, from the beginning of the 20th Century, to reject nationalism 
in a radical manner. That’s more sensitive as it’s recalled that that period, the 
end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th, was characterized by a 
nationalist scale exacerbatingly rightist, virtually proto-fascist.
The most emphatic and authorized voice to express herself against 
nationalism was Rosa Luxemburg (1870-1919) for her coalescence to militarism 
and to imperialism. In the opposite side, in the Marxist ﬁeld, was Otto Bauer 
(1881-1838) who demanded the nation for the socialist ﬁeld: 
The socialist society will fulﬁll Fichte’s desire: to make each one a participant of 
the national culture [...] Socialism ﬁnds its sense in the access of the entire people 
to the community of the national culture, in the conquering of the full self-
determination of the nation, in the national spiritual differentiation. (Bauer apud 
Gallissot, 1984, p.202)
An assessment of the consequences of the national issue since then, 
acknowledging what’s positive and legitimate about the anti-colonial nationalist 
movements, can’t avoid acknowledging as well certain harmful consequences of 
nationalism, that continue to express themselves.
That the question has been placed in the past according to an absolute 
disjunctive, either nationalism or internationalism, is a historical information 
explainable by the circumstances that surrounded that debate. For us, for our 
time, it must be said that both at that time and now the strictly Marxist answer 
to the question, because strictly dialectic and strictly committed to the full 
emancipation of humanity, claims the full afﬁnity between internationalism and 
nationalism, in the sense that the “nation is a common desire to live [...] it’s 
the desire to create a certain future. It’s an ideal to be fulﬁlled” (Febvre, 1998, 
p.230). The ideal of creating a free, equal and happy humankind.
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